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DOES THE PRESENCE OF INDEPENDENT 
DIRECTORS REDUCE THE PRACTICES OF EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT? THE MODERATING ROLE OF FAMILY 
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION
While often criticized, the independence of directors remains a crucial 
criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of the monitoring role of boards. 
This study examines the relationship between board independence and earn-
ings management, paying attention to moderation role of family ownership 
concentration on this relationship using a sample of services companies 
listed on Amman Stock Exchange ASE. This study documented a signiÞ cant 
and negative association between board independence and earnings man-
agement. In addition, the moderating role of family ownership concentration 
on this relationship was also negative. Thus, the board’s monitoring function 
was inefÞ cient due to the concentration of ownership. These results were 
obtained through using multiple and sequential regression analysis for the 
research data from 2013 to 2016. This study provides new ideas for future 
research such as examining the impacts of the migration of capitals and in-
vestors from neighbouring countries such as Syria and Iraq.
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 1. Introduction
Various previous research has widely believed that ß exibility in reporting may 
provide a channel for corporate managers through which they can opportunisti-
cally manipulate earnings, which, in turn, may negatively affect earnings quality 
and its use in the process of decision-making (Chang, Hwang, Li & Jhou, 2018; 
Poretti, Schatt & Bruynseels, 2018). The Þ nancial scandals surrounding several large 
Þ rms in the last decade (e.g., Xerox, Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, HealthSouth, Waste 
Management, Sunbeam and Rite Aid) have raised dangerous concerns regarding the 
mechanisms of governance particularly the effectiveness of monitoring tools that 
used by companies to insure the interests of shareholders and investors (Shin & Park, 
2018). Board independence deemed as one of the corporate governance mechanisms 
that widely viewed as a tool to limit the costly managerial incentives. Therefore, 
previous research has been documented that the boards with majority directors who 
are independence have a much ability to perform controlling and monitoring of op-
portunistic behaviours (Fan, 2017; Chee, Phua, & Yau, 2016). 
The proportion of independent directors on the board improve earnings qual-
ity and the reliability of the Þ nancial statements through reducing earnings man-
agement. Davidson, Goodwin Stewart & Kent (2005).  Found an empirical evi-
dence for the effective function of directors’ independent in limiting the practices 
of earnings management among Australian Þ rms. Alves (2014) concluded that in-
dependent members of board enhance the quality of corporate earnings through 
controlling the behaviour of corporate managers to limit earnings management 
practices for a sample of Portuguese listed Þ rms.
Leuz et al. (2003) pointed out that there is a higher level of earnings ma-
nipulation practices in countries with low protection of investor. In addition, as-
sorted studies have documented that the concentration of family ownership inß u-
ences earnings quality and corporate performance as well, where Ali, Chen and 
Radhakrishnan (2007) documented that reported earnings of family Þ rms are of 
better quality and face less severe agency problems that arise from the separa-
tion of ownership and management. But they (Ali. et al., 20107) pointed out that 
family Þ rms are less likely to make voluntary disclosures about their corporate 
governance practices. Labelle, Hafsi, Francoeur and Amar (2018) reported that 
family Þ rms exhibit lower corporate social performance than non-family Þ rms. 
They also found that family ownership concentration serving in stakeholder-ori-
ented countries are more attentive to social concerns than those operating in more 
shareholder-oriented countries.
Liu, Wilson and Wu (2017) found that family Þ rms also engage in less ac-
crual-based earnings management, although they are indistinguishable from non-
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family Þ rms in terms of real earnings management. A reason we study family 
ownership concentration (family Þ rms) is that the signiÞ cance and effect of the 
mechanisms of corporate governance to which they are subject vary in signiÞ cant 
ways from those of non-family Þ rms.
In prior studies such as Alzoubi (2016) documented that family Þ rms are 
found to have less independent directors on the boards, suggesting that the con-
trolling family prefers controllable board. In Jordan, over 45% of Þ rms are con-
trolled by family, and they are active in management aspects and engaging in 
various positions in management and tend to be passed on from one generation 
to another which means that they are seeking to retain control over the corporate 
management within family, and therefore suggest that the controlling family has 
motives to limit monitoring function of the board. In addition, an absence of mar-
ket for Þ rm control in Jordan can lead the family managers even more entrenched 
(Alzoubi, 2016, Sraheen, 2014). This study explores whether the domination of 
family members on corporate boards moderates the effectiveness of the monitor-
ing function of independent boards. Such an issue considered one motivation in 
conducting the current research because two opposing views exist on the inß uence 
of family Þ rms on independence boards and earnings management (Jiraporn, & 
DaDalt, 2009). These viewpoints will be discussed in the coming sections.
This study may be conceivably beneÞ cial as a supporting major for regula-
tory action, particularly those that inß uence the corporate ownership structure. 
The results have important implications for supervisors as well regulators, who 
will beneÞ t by the understanding of how the structure of corporate ownership af-
fects earnings management and enhance the level of Þ nancial reporting quality. 
This study also offers important contributions to both the literature and methodol-
ogy. First, this study is one of the Þ rst few studies illustrating the moderated effect 
of family-controlled Þ rms on the relationship between effectiveness of monitoring 
role of boards and earnings management. Second, this study also contributes to 
the understanding the importance of the role of independent boards of directors in 
Jordan, which is understudied in the previous literature such as Jaggi, Leung and 
Gul (2009) and Sraheen, Fadzil and Ismail (2014). 
Since the 1990s, the reform of corporate governance has been a signiÞ cant 
item in the Jordanian agenda to pursue sustainable and strengthened growth in 
various aspects of the Jordanian economy. The establishment of three new institu-
tions, the Securities Depository Centre (SDC), the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
and the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), has contributed positively to an 
improvement in the Jordanian business environment (Jaafar & El-Shawa, 2009). 
Despite such efforts directed at improving the regulatory environment and the 
practices of Jordanian corporate government, an evaluation made in 2004 by the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) pointed out that the situation 
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of corporate governance in Jordan remains at a relatively underdeveloped stage 
(Berg & Nenova, (2004). Such a statement is unsurprising, given that corporate 
governance is deemed a new concept in Arab countries. The report shows that the 
institutional framework suffers from a lack of enforcement capabilities and suffers 
from political interference. 
In addition to the above, several studies conducted in the Jordanian envi-
ronment have indicated that most Jordanian companies have practiced earnings 
management in their statements. The consequences of practices of earnings 
management are beyond doubt detrimental, decreasing the value of a company, 
its transactions, its image and its reputation, (Sraheen & Saleh, 2017; Ajeleh & 
Hamdan, 2009).  These detrimental consequences are in addition to the fear of the 
collapse of large Þ rms as has happened in developed countries, as mentioned pre-
viously (Rodriguez-Ariza, Rodriguez-Ariza, Martínez-Ferrero, Martínez-Ferrero, 
Bermejo-Sánchez & Bermejo-Sánchez, 2016). 
The current study produced its primary contribution through empirically 
showing that the structure of corporate ownership has various implications on 
earnings management. Moreover, the Þ ndings of the current study recommended 
that both researchers and policymakers would no longer consider corporate owner-
ship structure as a whole, given that the structure of ownership has diverse impli-
cations on earnings management measured by the discretionary accruals.
The main motivation for the current study is to address a literature gap in the 
board monitoring efÞ ciency and the institutional structure that affects the boards 
monitoring tasks by analysing data from an emerging market such as Jordan who’s 
institutional and regulatory landscapes are markedly different from those of de-
veloped countries. The study seeks to provide new insights into the role of board 
independence on the reduction of earnings management practices and the moder-
ating role of the concentration of family-ownership on this relationship, as well as 
highlight the need for further reform in the business and regulatory environment.
2.  Literature and hypothesis development
2.1. Board independence and earnings management
Corporate boards are formed for purpose monitoring and controlling cor-
porate managers on behalf of the corporate owners and shareholders. Agency 
theory stresses that the presence of independent directors has a positive inß uence 
on board effectiveness. In addition, the argument has been made that independent 
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members who dominate boards are in a better position to control and monitor the 
behavior of corporate managers. Consequently, independent members serving on a 
board may play a vital role in monitoring the stages of preparing of Þ nancial state-
ments by the corporate management (Frankel, McVay & Soliman, 2011). 
The inß uence of director independence on boards has been illustrated in 
many previous studies. The majority of this research has emphasized the role of 
independent directors in corporate boards in improving the monitoring function 
of the corporate board to monitor managerial activities and the behaviours of the 
managers as well. Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart, and Kent (2005) documented 
that corporate boards with majority of independent directors limits the practice 
of earnings management. Marra, Mazzola and Prencipe (2011) also pointed out 
that including non-executive directors on a corporate board plays a vital role in 
constraining the practices of earnings management. Chen, Knechel, Marisetty, 
Truong, and Veeraraghavan (2016) showed that the independence of board mem-
bers was closely related with the timely addressing of the weaknesses of internal 
control.
To effectively perform their monitoring and advising tasks, the indepen-
dent directors must have a substantial amount of detailed information regarding a 
Þ rm’s activities. In some scenarios, the environment of corporate information is 
opaque, and to acquire the necessary information regarding operating, investing 
and Þ nancing activities of Þ rms is deemed costly; thus, independent directors in 
these corporate boards would be less effective (Armstrong, Core & Guay, 2014). 
Therefore, to keep both independent directors and corporate owners informed 
about the various activities and the performance of management as well, the man-
agement has a Þ duciary responsibility to offer detailed information to these par-
ties.  Such transparency may be impaired when insiders dominate the corporate 
boards (Chen, Cheng & Wang, 2015; Daoud et al., 2015). 
On the other hand, Daghsni, Zouhayer & Mbarek (2016) have been docu-
mented in their study that there is no effect of the board independence on the 
earnings management among French companies. In addition to this point of view, 
the concept of independence in the current study refers to independence of mind 
rather than independence of appearance. The appointment of non-executive (inde-
pendent) directors is subject to the discretion of corporate top managements, and 
thus it may not reß ect the meaning of “truly independence”. Therefore, based on 
such divergence of views on this relationship, the Þ rst hypothesis is set as follows:
H1: A high proportion of non-executive directors (independent directors) on 
the board reduces earnings management practices.
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2.2. Board independence and earnings management in family-controlled 
companies
It has been argued previously (see, for example, Chen & Jaggi, 2000) that 
because of the scattering of institutional capital, the powers of owners have con-
ferred upon corporate managers. Corporate managers have less-speciÞ c targets 
than Þ rms due to variety of ownership structures among shareholders in Þ rms, so 
corporate managers can exert political inß uence to maintain their powers more 
systematically (Al-Sraheen & Alkhatib, 2017). Thus, the argument suggests that 
activities of corporate managers must be properly tracked to avoid the abuse of 
power and opportunistic behavior, such as the maximization of their own wealth 
(Khalil & Ozkan, 2016). It has been documented that a higher percentage of inde-
pendent members on boards facilitates the monitoring task and limits managerial 
opportunism (Khalil & Ozkan, 2016; Chen et al., 2015).
The key concerns in this research are centred around the independence of di-
rectors, which is more likely to be compromised when family controls a Þ rm either 
through appointing family members to the board or ownership domination. That 
is because family members can control the appointment of independent directors 
appointment (independence in appearance) (Chen & Jaggi, 2000). These so-called 
independent directors on such boards are less likely to go against the wishes and 
policies of controlling family members, particularly when they work as members 
of corporate boards. 
Family-owned shareholdings account for a high proportion among Jordanian 
Þ rms as Jaafar and El-Shawa (2009) document.  They mentioned in their results 
that more than 51% of Jordanian listed Þ rms are family-owned Þ rms. Because of 
the concentration of family ownership, the mechanisms of market monitoring are 
poor in Jordan; mergers, acquisitions and hostile takeovers are almost non-existent 
in the Jordanian context. In addition, due to the concentration of family ownership, 
the shareholdings of institutional are not very common either (Jaafar & El-Shawa, 
2009). Jordanian Þ rms also differ from other Þ rms in nearby countries Þ rms re-
garding generating funds; private borrowing through Þ nancial institutions such 
as banks is more common in Jordan rather than public debt (Alkhawaldeh, 2012).
The family ownership concentration as a phenomenon in Jordan and has led 
to divide the shareholders into two distinct categories, i.e., minority and majority 
shareholders. As a result of such categories of shareholders, family companies are 
likely to suffer from conß icts between minority and majority shareholders. Boards 
with a majority of family members will have an incentive to expropriate the inter-
ests of minority shareholders, therefore, they will have an opportunity to limit both 
controlling and monitoring function by the independent directors they appoint. 
In addition, their independence is possibly adversely affected and compromised 
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because of their loyalty and closeness to the controlling family that has appointed 
or reappointed them to the boards. Thus, this study develops posits the following 
hypothesis to investigate this expectation:
H2: The relationship between board independence and earnings management 
is moderated by family ownership concentration.
3. Research methodology 
This section highlights the process of sample selection, sources of data collection 
and the description of the measurements of research variables. 
3.1. Sample data collection sources
The impact of board independence on earning management in Jordan is in-
vestigated in this study. In addition, the moderating role of family ownership on 
the association between independence of board and earning management is ex-
plored in this study. The initial sample of this study includes all services com-
panies whose stocks were listed in the Amman Stock Exchange over the period 
2013 to 2016. There were 148 Þ rms, and the Þ nal sample included 72 Þ rms, which 
comprised 49% of the initial sample. All Þ rms that did not have enough data were 
omitted. This led to 288 Þ rm-year observations in total over four years, and the 
required research data were hand-collected from the annual Þ nancial reports of 
the companies that were annually submitted to the Amman Stock Exchange from 
2013 to 2016. 
3.2. Models and measurements of the study 
This study proposes two models. The regression model is used in testing 
the impact of board independence on earnings management. Moreover, the cur-
rent study considers the moderating effect of family ownership concentration on 
the relationship between independence of board and earnings management in the 
context of Jordan. For the purpose of reaching this objective, this study uses the 
sequential regression analysis (also called hierarchical regression) to test the mod-
eration hypotheses and ascertain the effects of family ownership concentration 
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as a moderating variable on the association between independence of board and 
earning management. 
The following are the models of the study:
Model (1): examines the effect of board independence on earning manage-
ment:
Model (2): examines the moderating role of family ownership concentration 
on the association between independence of board and earning management.
Where:
DAC = Discretionary Accruals measured by the ModiÞ ed Jones Model
BIND = Board Independence 
FAOW = Family Ownership
BIND*FAOW = Interaction between board independence and family ownership
There is a long history of the research on earnings management, and Healy 
and Wahlen’s (1999) deÞ nition is one of the most widely accepted deÞ nitions of 
earnings management. They deÞ ned earnings management as “Earnings manage-
ment occurs when managers use judgement in Þ nancial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter Þ nancial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to inß uence contractual out-
comes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (p. 368). The accounting ac-
cruals approach is used in the current study as proxy of earnings management, this 
measurement called the Jones’ (1991) model, which was revised later by Dechow 
and Sloan (1996). Some previous research such as Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 
(1995) have analysed alternative measurements of accrual-based approaches for 
discovering earnings management and documented that the most powerful mea-
surement is the modiÞ ed Jones model developed in 1991 (Al-Sraheen & Alkhatib, 
2017).  The non-discretionary accruals (ND) is calculated using equation (1) 
                                                              
 (1)
Here, TA refers to Total Accruals; LTA = Lagged Total Assets; REV = 
Change in Revenues from the preceding year; AR= Change in Accounts 
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Receivable from the preceding year; PPE represents Þ rm’s gross property, 
plant and equipment. Meanwhile, a1- a3 entail the regression parameters 
and  refers to equal error term.
Discretionary accruals (DA), equation (2) below, are calculated as the re-
sidual value after deducting non-discretionary accruals from the total accruals. 
                                                              
 (2)
As for family Þ rms, this study adopts the 10% or more as threshold for clas-
sifying Þ rms as family owned and controlled. Such a measurement was used by 
previous research such as Chen and Jaggi (2000).
The independent director is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if di-




Descriptive statistics have the primary objective of describing the elementary 
structures of the data. The statistics offer a simple summary about the study’s vari-
ables. The descriptive statistics for the sample comprise 288 observations while 
the average of the sample over four years is for the 72 Þ rms employed in the regres-
sion analysis for the period of 2013 to 2016. These are presented in Table 1. The 
mean of earnings management for the Jordanian Þ rms is about 9.67%%, ranges 
between about 34.5% and -31.0% on average, the research sample records positive 
discretionary accruals. This may indicate that Jordanian listed companies in this 
study are managing their earnings upwardly. This result is close to the Þ nding of 
Al-Fayoumi, Abuzayed, and Alexander (2010) who reported the average of discre-
tionary accruals was 12% in their study.
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Table 1. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
EM 72 -31.00 34.50 .0967 21.78915
BIND 72 .00 1.00 .3889 .49092
FAMOW 72 .00 .86 .5816 .20808
The average board independence was 38.89%, which shows that the Jordanian 
Þ rms were committed to the recommendations of corporate governance code that 
at least one third of the members of the board director should be independent. 
Such a result is higher than the result of Marashdeh (2014) who reported an av-
erage was 24%, which used the data from 2002-2010. Thus, this was deemed 
as indicator that Jordanian companies became highly committed to the rules of 
Jordanian corporate governance after the issuance of Jordanian Code of Corporate 
Governance in 2009. The statistics results show that the average value of fam-
ily shares of the companies in the sample held by family members comprised 
58.16% at the 10% ownership threshold. Family ownership represents 58.16% of 
the capital of Jordanian companies compared to 38% for listed Þ rms in Malaysia 
(Tam & Tan, 2007). The result of this current study was higher than the result of 
Marashdeh (2014) who documented that the mean of family ownership of indus-
trial and services Jordanian companies listed on the ASE was 45%. 
4.2. Correlation analysis 
The Pearson Correlation is commonly used in the measurement for the pres-
ence of correlations among variables and in demonstrating if a statistically sub-
stantial linear association is present between variables and the direction and the 
strength and of a linear association. The Pearson Correlation coefÞ cients among 
the variables are presented in Table 2. In this study, the correlation coefÞ cients 
among the variables in the correlation matrix were all less than 0.90 showing that 
multicollinearity (one of regression assumptions) is not an issue within the regres-
sion models (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Latham, 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). In this study, the Pearson Correlation matrix shows that the highest correla-
tion was between independence of board (BIND) and earnings management (EM) 
and the value of correlation was (0.449). 
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This study used multiple regression analysis to compute the relationships be-
tween board independent and earning management. The results of regression anal-
ysis in Table 3 indicate that the adjusted R2 value for the Model was 19%, which 
demonstrates that 19% of the variance of earnings management was explained 
by board independence. This study suggests adding new corporate governance 
variables such as CEO duality, audit committee and managerial ownership to the 
current research model in order to enhance the explanatory capacity (R2) of the 
current model.
 Results indicate a statistical signiÞ cance association between board indepen-
dence and earning management (F-statistic = 17.634, p = 0.000), which means that 
the model expressively elucidates the difference in earning management among 
the listed Þ rms in Jordan. In addition, the direct relationship between board inde-
pendence and earnings management was negative and signiÞ cant (t = -4.199; p = 
.0.000). Such results indicate that a higher proportion of independence members 
on the board constrains the practices of earnings management among in Jordanian 
context. Boards with a higher number of independent directors have a higher abil-
ity to monitor the opportunistic behaviours of managers; this result is consistent 
with Fan, (2017) and Chee, Phua, and Yau (2016).
This study employed sequential regression analysis to determine whether 
family ownership does indeed moderate the association between independence of 
board and earnings management. As evidenced by the outcomes of the sequential 
regression analysis in Table 3, family ownership positively moderates the associa-
tion between independence of board and earning management.
The following table is a summary of the sequential regression model. The ta-
ble below describes the results of moderating role of family ownership concentra-
tion on the relationship between board independence and earnings management. 
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Table 3. 
SEQUENTIAL MODERATED REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Variables I.V Moderate BIND*FAOW
Main Effect t – value Sig t – value Sig t – value Sig
BIND -4.199 .000 -4.468 1.287
Moderate Effect
FAOW - - 2.655 .010 3.602 .001
Interaction Effect
BIND*FAOW - - - - -2.505 .015
R2 0.449 .525 .580
Adjusted R2 .190 .254 .307
R2 Change .201 .074 .061
F sig. Change .000 .010 .015
The results show that the research model was signiÞ cant at the 0.05 level 
of signiÞ cance (t = -2.505; p = .015). The Þ ndings of the moderating regression 
indicate also that the family ownership concentration affected adversely the re-
lationships between board independence and earnings management. This means 
that the presence of family members on the corporate boards mitigates against the 
effectiveness of the boards and their monitoring function. Therefore, boards with 
independent directors and family concentration should be considered independent 
in appearance only. This practice harms the efÞ ciency of the boards and gives 
space to the corporate managers to practice their opportunistic behaviours. Such 
Þ nding is also supported by the prior studies such as Mengoli, Pazzaglia & Sandri 
(2017) and Kazemian and Sanusi (2015) who have been documented in their study 
that ownership concentration is negatively to earnings  management.
The Þ ndings of the current study are consistent also with the survey Þ nd-
ings on Hong Kong companies, which pointed out that most companies with a 
concentration of family ownership appoint family members on corporate boards 
to take care of their own interests (Ho & Wong, 2001). It has also been noted in 
other research that boards with a majority of family members also hold executive 
positions in the company. Such a case creates a unique situation with respect to the 
domination of family ownership with the control of the Þ rm. Because of the domi-
nation of family, the agency conß ict shifts from a shareholder-manager conß ict to 
a minority-majority shareholder conß ict (Claessens & Fan, 2002).
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5. Conclusion
The aim of current study was to investigate the effect of board independence 
on earnings management. In addition, this study sought to identify the role of fam-
ily ownership concentration on the relationship between board independence and 
earnings management. The study found that a negative and signiÞ cant association 
existed between board independence and earnings management. This means that 
the existence of independent directors on the board will restrict the opportunistic 
behavior of corporate managers. On the other hand, the study concluded that fam-
ily ownership concentration on the corporate board will harm the independence of 
board members, and will provide managers with more opportunity to manipulate 
the earnings.
This study makes several new contributions. First, the results of this study 
may contribute by limiting the agency conß ict, where the independent board mem-
bers may have an important monitoring function of the Þ nancial reporting process 
and are therefore expected to insist on better earnings quality by reducing earnings 
management practices.  Second, a focus on Jordan is important because family 
ownership concentration is high, which impedes all the monitoring tools proposed 
by corporate governance such as the independence of board members as stated in 
the results of this study. Such concentration of ownership is exist in various coun-
tries, and therefore, the results of the current study are generalizable. Such results 
may assist decision makers in providing a set of instructions to ensure the quality 
of the Þ nancial information reported in the Þ nancial statements by limiting the 
negative effect of ownership concentration on that information.
There are various potential opportunities to be considered in the future for 
more research and improvements. For example, foreign ownership and its impact 
on the earnings management and the quality of Þ nancial statements. Especially 
after the migration of Syrian and Iraqi capitals and investors to Jordan due to the 
political and security situation in that countries. 
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JE LI PRISUTNOST NEOVISNIH DIREKTORA SMANJUJE PRAKSE UPRAVLJANJA 
PLA AMA? MODERIRAJU A ULOGA KONCENTRACIJE OBITELJSKOG VLASNIŠTVA
Sažetak
Iako se esto kritizira, neovisnost direktora ostaje klju ni kriterij za procjenu u inkovitosti 
nadzorne uloge odbora direktora. Ovo istraživanje ispituje odnos izme u neovisnosti odbora direk-
tora i upravljanja pla ama, s posebnom pažnjom na moderiraju u ulogu koncentracije obiteljskog 
vlasništva na ovaj odnos, a uz pomo  uzorka uslužnih korporacija koje su na ammanskoj burzi. 
Ovo istraživanje je potvrdilo zna ajnu, negativnu povezanost izme u neovisnosti odbora direkto-
ra i upravljanja pla ama. Osim toga, moderiraju a uloga obiteljskog vlasništva na ovu korelaciju 
je tako er bila negativna. Stoga se nadzorna uloga odbora direktora pokazala neu inkovita zbog 
koncentracije obiteljskog vlasništva. Rezultati su dobiveni korištenjem višestruke i sekvencijske 
regresijske analize podataka u razdoblju od 2013. do 2016. godine. Istraživanje pruža nove ideje za 
budu a istraživanja kao što su ispitivanje utjecaja kretanja kapitala i investitora iz susjednih zemalja 
kao što su Sirija i Irak. 
Klju ne rije i: neovisnost odbora, obiteljsko vlasništvo, upravljanje pla ama, ammanska burza 
